

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
FORT MYERS DIVISION

SIERRA CLUB and ENVIRONMENTAL  
CONFEDERATION OF SOUTHWEST  
FLORIDA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No.: 2:20-cv-13-FtM-38NPM

U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE  
SERVICE, AURELIA SKIPWORTH,  
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF  
TRANSPORTATION, KEVIN J.  
THIBAUT, U.S. ARMY CORP OF  
ENGINEERS and TODD T.  
SEMONITE,

Defendants.

\_\_\_\_\_ /

**OPINION AND ORDER**<sup>1</sup>

Before the Court is Defendants' Opposed Joint Motion to Dismiss Counts One and Three of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ([Doc. 35](#)), Plaintiffs' response ([Doc. 39](#)), Defendants' reply ([Doc. 42](#)), and Plaintiffs' surreply ([Doc. 43](#)). For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion.

**BACKGROUND**

Eleven years ago, the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) began plans to widen 18 miles of State Road (SR) 29.<sup>2</sup> During that process, FDOT was required by

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<sup>2</sup> State Road 82 is also at issue in this lawsuit, but the Motion to Dismiss involves only State Road 29.

federal environmental laws—namely, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—to consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to analyze any impacts the project would have on the endangered Florida Panther.

Ultimately, FDOT invoked a categorical exclusion (CE) to the applicability of NEPA, opining that the road expansion would not have significant effects on the environment. And the USFWS issued a biological opinion (BiOp), concluding that the road widening would adversely impact the Florida Panther but would not likely jeopardize the panther's continued existence. Plaintiffs challenge these agency actions as unlawful under the ESA, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and seek declaratory and injunctive relief to protect the Florida Panther.

After suit was filed, FDOT purportedly rendered the BiOp inoperative by rescinding the CE due to lack of funding. Because the CE and BiOp were the bases for Counts 1 and 3, Defendants argue Counts 1 and 3 are moot. In support, Defendants submit two emails and a letter. The first is an internal FDOT email requesting rescission of the CE because construction funding is not anticipated for at least ten years and there are no active state or federal environmental permits along the corridor. ([Doc. 35-3](#)). FDOT's Office of Environmental Management approved the request to rescind on June 5, 2020 ([Doc. 35-4](#)). Consequently, the USFWS did not consider its BiOP "to be operative." ([Doc. 35-5](#)). The USFWS' email to FDOT concluded: "When you are ready to go forward with the project, you may re-initiate consultation with the Service, per your current agreement with the [Federal Highway Administration] to conduct consultations, pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973." ([Doc. 35-5](#)).

In response, Plaintiffs make two arguments: (1) that the agencies lacked authority to rescind the CE and BiOP; and (2) an exception to the mootness doctrine—voluntary cessation—applies. The Court agrees that based on Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent Defendants have not met their burden to show unambiguous termination of the challenged conduct. Counts 1 and 3 are therefore not moot. Defendants’ finality argument—a thinly veiled rehash of their mootness argument—fails for the same reasons.

## DISCUSSION

### A. Mootness

Ultimately, “mootness is a jurisdictional issue,” so Rule 12(b)(1) governs. See *Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, Ga.*, 654 F.3d 1231, 1239 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011). These attacks take two forms: facial and factual. *Meyer v. Fey Servicing, LLC*, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1229 (M.D. Fla. 2019). On a factual attack—like this one—the challenge goes to “subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.” *Morrison v. Amway Corp.*, 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). So courts “consider extrinsic evidence such as testimony and affidavits.” *Id.* If a defendant claims “voluntary compliance moots a case,” it “bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’tl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).

Article III of the Constitution, known as the case and controversies limitation, prevents federal courts from deciding moot questions because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III. Mootness can occur due to a change in circumstances or a change in law. *Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise*, 371

F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2004). A case is also moot when the issue presented is no longer live, the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in its outcome, or a decision could no longer provide meaningful relief to a party. *Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cty., Fla.*, 382 F.3d. 1276 (11th Cir. 2004); *Christian Coal. of Ala. v. Cole*, 355 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004); *Crown Media LLC v. Gwinnett County, Ga*, 380 F.3d. 1317 (11th Cir. 2004). Dismissal is not discretionary but “is required because mootness is jurisdictional. Any decision on the merits would be an impermissible advisory opinion.” *Troiano*, 382 F.3d at 1282 (citing *Al Najjar v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2001)).

That said, there is an exception to the mootness doctrine for those cases in which a defendant voluntarily ceases the challenged practice. “It is well settled that when a defendant chooses to end a challenged practice, this choice does not always deprive a federal court of its power to decide the legality of the practice.” *Doe v. Wooten*, 747 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env'tl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). “It is no small matter to deprive a litigant of the rewards of its efforts....Such action on grounds of mootness would be justified only if it were absolutely clear that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial protection that it sought.” *Id.* at 1319. Thus, a defendant who claims to have mooted an action by his own conduct “bears a formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” *Id.* at 1322; *Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.*, 716 F.3d 525, 531 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Since the defendant is free to return to his old ways, he bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that his cessation of the challenged conduct renders the controversy moot.”).

A government actor who voluntarily ceases alleged wrongful conduct is entitled to a “rebuttable presumption” or a “lesser burden” that the conduct will not recur, but only if it demonstrates “unambiguous termination of the challenged conduct.” [Wooten, 747 F.3d at 1322](#). The presumption may be rebutted by “some reasonable basis to believe that the [conduct] will be reinstated if the suit is terminated.” *Id.* In evaluating whether there is a reasonable basis the challenged conduct will recur, the Eleventh Circuit considers these factors:

(1) whether the termination of the offending conduct was unambiguous; (2) whether the change in government policy or conduct appears to be the result of substantial deliberation, or is simply an attempt to manipulate jurisdiction; and (3) whether the government has consistently applied a new policy or adhered to a new course of conduct.

*Id.* at 1322-23 (internal quotation marks omitted). Timing matters. “[T]he timing and content of the decision are...relevant in assessing whether the defendant’s ‘termination’ of the challenged conduct is sufficiently ‘unambiguous’ to warrant application of the...presumption in favor of governmental entities.” [Rich, 716 F.3d at 531-32](#).

Voluntary cessation likely will not moot a controversy if the government actor provides no assurance it will not reinstate the challenged practice after the litigation ends, or if the circumstances suggest the defendant voluntarily ceased the offending conduct to avoid litigation. See [Sheeley v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1184 \(11th Cir. 2007\)](#); [Rich, 716 F.3d at 531-32](#).

Applying the above factors to the limited record the Court has before it, Defendants fail to meet their “formidable” burden to show the challenged conduct has been “unambiguously terminated” or that the allegedly wrongful conduct will not recur after this litigation ends. Defendants are not entitled to the lesser burden because they have not

shown unambiguous termination of the challenged conduct. What is more, the language of Defendants' emails provides a "reasonable basis to believe that the [conduct] will be reinstated if the suit is terminated." *Wooten*, 747 F.3d at 1322.

The FDOT internal emails state that the "purpose of this project was to widen State Road 29 from two to four lanes within the project limits, to improve level of service along the roadway, accommodate future population and employment growth, and enhance safety conditions." (Doc. 35-3). The email also states that the latest traffic analysis along the SR 29 corridor meets the threshold for widening the roadway by the year 2025. (Doc. 35-3). And it concludes, "Any future environmental action within this corridor will include the most recent data and information relating to the environmental and economic landscape of the project area and will comply with the appropriate state and federal requirements." (Doc. 35-3). In other words, Defendants have simply delayed the project's implementation, and the need for this road project remains. The equivocation continues in the USFWS email to FDOT: "we are aware the FDOT *intends* to rescind the type II categorical exclusion for the State Road 29 from State Road 82 to County Road 80A project." (Doc. 35-5 (emphasis added)). Although the email concludes that USFWS "does not consider" the BiOp "to be operative" (itself an ambiguous statement), it invited FDOT to re-initiate consultation when they are ready to go forward with the project. (Doc. 35-5). But Defendants have never said that they would not continue with the current plans for SR 29, just that they would do so ten years down the road. Thus, it is not "absolutely clear that [Plaintiffs] no longer had any need of the judicial protection" they seek, see *Wooten*, 747 F.3d at 1319, and Counts 1 and 3 are not moot.

## **B. Finality**

Absent specific statutory authorization, courts may review agency actions only if they are final. [5 U.S.C. § 704](#). An agency action is final if two conditions are met:

First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.

[Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 \(1997\)](#) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Defendants purport to challenge the finality of the CE and BiOp, but stripped of its façade, their finality argument is merely a restatement of their mootness claim. (See, e.g., [Doc. 35 at 15](#) (“Here, because the CE and [BiOp] have been rescinded, there is not any remaining agency action with respect to the SR 29 project, as is required by the APA for this Court’s review.”)).


Defendants do not contest that the CE and BiOp were final agency actions when Plaintiffs sued. Defendants instead argue the actions are no longer final because the agencies must revisit their decisions before proceeding with the SR 29 project in the future. But the possibility that the agencies might reverse course based on new information “does not make an otherwise definitive decision nonfinal.” [U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 \(2016\)](#). And the internal correspondence presented by Defendants do not eliminate the legal consequences of the CE and BiOp. See [Soundboard Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 888 F.3d 1261, 1268 \(D.C. Cir. 2018\)](#) (contrasting a final, formal, published report with an informal letter by a subordinate official because the letter was nonbinding and could be rescinded at any time without notice). The CE and BiOp thus satisfy the APA’s finality requirement.

Accordingly, it is now

**ORDERED:**

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 and 3 ([Doc. 35](#)) is **DENIED**.

**DONE** and **ORDERED** in Fort Myers, Florida this 19th day of August, 2020.

  
SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
FORT MYERS DIVISION

SIERRA CLUB and  
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DEPARTMENT OF  
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THIBAULT, U.S. ARMY CORP OF  
ENGINEERS and TODD T.  
SEMONITE,

Defendants.

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**OPINION AND ORDER**<sup>1</sup>

Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's August 19, 2020 Order denying the motion to dismiss Count One of plaintiffs' complaint. ([Doc. 46](#)) filed by Todd. T. Semonite, Aurelia Skipworth, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), a Motion for Reconsideration of the August 19, 2020 Order denying the motion to dismiss

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Count Three of plaintiffs' complaint ([Doc. 57](#)) filed by Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT"), and plaintiffs' responses in opposition. ([Doc. 49](#); [Doc. 58](#)).

## **BACKGROUND**

FDOT planned to widen 18 miles of State Road (SR) 29.<sup>2</sup> To do so, FDOT needed to comply with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and have FWS analyze the expected effect of the project on the endangered Florida Panther.

FDOT ultimately invoked a categorical exclusion (CE) to the applicability of NEPA, opining that the road expansion would not have significant effects on the environment. On January 22, 2016, FWS issued a biological opinion (BiOp) finding that road widening on SR 29 would have adverse impacts on the Florida Panther but concluding that the project was not likely to jeopardize the panther's continued existence. ([Doc. 24 at 10](#)). On June 10, 2016, FWS amended its BiOp's mitigation requirement for installation of two wildlife underpasses to require the installation of underpasses or other wildlife crossing feature or structure for the SR 29 project. ([Doc. 24 at 10](#)).

Plaintiffs claim the BiOp "fails to make a 'rational connection between the facts and the choices made' regarding the impacts of development and associated habitat loss on the Florida Panther." ([Doc. 24 at 17](#)). They allege several ways in

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<sup>2</sup> The case also involves whether defendants complied with the ESA and NEPA on the SR 82 project.

which the BiOp was allegedly deficient. ([Doc. 24 at 17-18](#)). Plaintiffs further claim the CE prepared by FDOT to assess the environmental impacts of the SR 29 expansion was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. ([Doc. 24 at 19-20](#)).

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Count 1 and Count 3 pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12\(b\)\(1\)](#), arguing the claims were moot. ([Doc. 35](#)). In support, they provided two emails and a letter. The Court denied the motion, finding that it was unclear whether Defendants had “unambiguously terminated” the project. ([Doc. 44](#)).

Now, Defendants have filed two separate motions for reconsideration, providing “new evidence” they insist compels the Court to find the counts moot. ([Doc. 46](#); [Doc. 57](#)). In support, they provide one letter, one affidavit, and one publication from a Fort Myers newspaper. The letter is from FWS Field Supervisor Roxanna Hinzman; it formally withdraws the BiOp challenged by Plaintiffs. ([Doc. 46-1](#)). The affidavit is from Jason Watts, the Director of FDOT’s Office on Environment Management; therein, Watts says he officially rescinded the CE for the SR 29 project on June 5, 2020. ([Doc. 57-1](#)). The newspaper article announces to the public the Type II CE was rescinded on June 5, 2020. ([Doc. 57-2](#)). Plaintiffs oppose both motions. ([Doc. 55](#); [Doc. 58](#)).

## **DISCUSSION**

### **1. The Motion for Reconsideration**

“A motion for reconsideration must show why the court should reconsider its prior decision and ‘set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.’” *Fla. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). Courts generally recognize three grounds for reconsidering an order: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. *Id.* The burden is upon the movant to establish the extraordinary circumstances supporting reconsideration.” *Mannings v. Sch. Bd. Of Hillsboro Cnty., Fla.*, 149 F.R.D. 235, 235 (M.D. Fla. 1993). “A court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for reconsideration.” See *Drago v. Jenne*, 453 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006).

The motion to reconsider must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to demonstrate to the court the reason to reverse its prior decision. *Taylor Woodrow Constr. Corp. v. Sarasota/Manatee Airport Auth.*, 814 F. Supp. 1072, 1072-73 (M.D. Fla. 1993); *PaineWebber Income Props. Three Ltd. P’ship v. Mobil Oil Corp.*, 902 F.Supp. 1514, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1995). “When issues have been carefully considered and decisions rendered, the only reason which should commend reconsideration of that decision is a change in the factual or legal underpinning upon which the decision was based.” *Taylor Woodrow*, 814 F. Supp. at 1072-73.

Plaintiffs object to these motions on procedural grounds. They assert this is not really a motion for reconsideration because the evidence relied upon in these motions was available at the time of the original motion to dismiss. The Court also doubts the procedural propriety of the motions, but for a different reason. Defendants' motions are based on new documents created after the Court denied their initial motion. Thus, instead of asking the Court to reconsider its prior decision, Defendants argue Counts One and Three have since been rendered moot by new operative agency actions. A motion for reconsideration is not the proper vehicle for such an argument.

Still, the Court will consider the merits of the motions because they present a jurisdictional issue that determines whether the Court even has power to hear this case. Mootness is jurisdictional. *See, e.g., Phone-Sweeps, LLC v. Seminole County, Florida*, No. 6:11-cv-155-Orl-28GJK, 2013 WL 12360840, at \*3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2013) ("Mootness divests the Court of jurisdiction because there is no longer an active case or controversy.") (internal citation omitted). Federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider moot claims. *Church of Scientology v. United States*, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Any question about jurisdiction must be answered at the outset.

## **2. Mootness**

Article III of the Constitution, known as the cases and controversies limitation, prevents federal courts from deciding moot questions because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III. "The doctrine of mootness derives

directly from the case-or-controversy limitation because an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.” *Florida Pub. Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. E.P.A.*, 386 F.3d 1070, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “A case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

A remote possibility that an event might recur is not enough to overcome mootness, and even a likely recurrence is insufficient if there would be ample opportunity for review at that time. *Soliman v. United States ex. rel. INS*, 296 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002). “The ‘heavy burden of persua[ding]’ the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably expected to start up again lies with the party asserting mootness.” *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (internal citations omitted).

A government actor who voluntarily ceases alleged wrongful conduct is entitled to a “rebuttable presumption” or a “lesser burden” that the conduct will not recur, but only if it demonstrates “unambiguous termination of the challenged conduct.” *Wooten*, 747 F.3d at 1322. The presumption may be rebutted by “some reasonable basis to believe that the [conduct] will be reinstated if the suit is terminated.” *Id.* In evaluating whether there is a reasonable basis the challenged conduct will recur, the Eleventh Circuit considers these factors: (1) whether the termination of the offending conduct was unambiguous; (2) whether the change in government policy or conduct appears to be the result of substantial deliberation, or is simply an attempt to manipulate jurisdiction; and (3) whether the

government has consistently applied a new policy or adhered to a new course of conduct. *Id.* at 1322-23 (internal quotation marks omitted). Timing matters. “[T]he timing and content of the decision are...relevant in assessing whether the defendant’s ‘termination’ of the challenged conduct is sufficiently ‘unambiguous’ to warrant application of the...presumption in favor of governmental entities.” *Rich*, 716 F.3d at 531-32.

Applying the above factors to the record the Court has before it, Defendants meet their burden of demonstrating the “unambiguous termination” of the challenged conduct. The Court looks at Count One and Count Three in turn.

**a. Count One**

The Court previously denied the motion to dismiss because the FWS email correspondence did not eliminate the legal consequences of the BiOp. The Court observed the FWS email by a subordinate official was nonbinding and could be rescinded at any time. ([Doc. 44 at 7](#)).

In the new letter, FWS field supervisor Roxanna Hinzman formally withdraws the BiOp at issue. ([Doc. 46-1 at 2](#)). Hinzman states “to remove any ambiguity with respect to our position on the SR 29 BiOp, we are by this formally withdrawing the January 22, 2016, BiOp and June 10, 2016, BiOp amendment. This withdrawal action is at the same delegated signatory level at which the BiOp was issued.” ([Doc. 46-1 at 2](#)). Hinzman was the person who originally signed the BiOp.

This letter unambiguously terminates the project. Based on the Court's reading of the letter, the BiOp has been withdrawn and is no longer operative. If at some point Defendants move forward with the project, they will have to submit a new BiOp, which Plaintiffs may challenge.

**b. Count Three**

The Court previously denied the motion to dismiss because it concluded FDOT did not meet its burden of showing unambiguous termination of the Department's adoption of the Type II CE. ([Doc. 44 at 5](#)).

On this motion, FDOT provides two pieces of evidence to support its argument. First, FDOT provides a public notice in a Fort Myers newspaper, stating "[e]ffective June 5, 2020, the Type II Categorical Exclusion PD&E Study and related Location and Design Concept Acceptance ("LDCA") for this 18-mile project was rescinded and the project will not be moving to the next phase of development." ([Doc. 57-2](#)). Second, it provides an affidavit from Jason Watts, the Director of the FDOT's Office of Environmental Management, wherein he states he officially rescinded the CE and related LCDA on June 5, 2020. ([Doc. 57-1](#)). As a result, the SR 29 project is not authorized for advancement to other phases and any future effort to advance the project would require the completion of a new environmental document. ([Doc. 57-1](#)).

The Court finds that Count Three is moot. The record evidence shows that the CE was rescinded, and that a new environmental document would have to be issued if the project is resumed. Other federal district courts have reached the



same decision in similar circumstances. See [West v. Horner](#), 810 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss because the CE was rescinded and the project abandoned); [North Cascades Conservation Council v. Federal Hwy. Admin.](#), No. C11-0666JLR, 2011 WL 2976913, at \*3 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 2011) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss the case as moot because the CE was withdrawn).

### CONCLUSION


Defendants have presented new evidence that renders the dispute moot. Defendants have withdrawn the decision that Plaintiffs challenged in Count One and Count Three, have cancelled the project, and have ensured that the SR 29 project will not move forward absent a new analysis. On that basis, any decision on Counts One and Three would be advisory, and they are thus moot.

Accordingly, it is now

### ORDERED:

Defendants' Motions for Reconsideration ([Doc. 46](#); [Doc. 57](#)) are **GRANTED**. Count One and Count Three of the Amended Complaint are **DISMISSED**.

**DONE** and **ORDERED** in Fort Myers, Florida on October 21, 2020.

  
SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record